Four studies examined whether people tend to lose confidence in their prospects for success the closer they are to the "moment of truth." Study 1 found that students think they will do better on their midterm exams when asked on the 1st day of class than when asked on the day of the exam. Studies 2 and 4 replicated this finding under controlled conditions. Study 3 demonstrated that the same effect holds retrospectively: People are more confident that they would have performed well at a task long after the time to perform has passed. Data are presented indicating that these results stem from a tendency for people to feel more "accountable" for their assessments, and thus focus less on the causes of success and more on the causes of failure, as the time to perform approaches. Implications for the experience of regret are discussed.
Effect of Temporal Perspective on Subjective Confidence
Four studies examined whether people tend to lose confidence in their prospects for success the closer they are to the "moment of truth." Study 1 found that students think they will do better on their midterm exams when asked on the 1st day of class than when asked on the day of the exam. Studies 2 and 4 replicated this finding under controlled conditions. Study 3 demonstrated that the same effect holds retrospectively: People are more confident that they would have performed well at a task long after the time to perform has passed. Data are presented indicating that these results stem from a tendency for people to feel more "accountable" for their assessments, and thus focus less on the causes of success and more on the causes of failure, as the time to perform approaches. Implications for the experience of regret are discussed.
As those who spend time in academic environments know too well, many students routinely excel on exams and yet, just before taking a test, are convinced they will do poorly. Similarly, the sports world is full of boastful fans who generally view their teams as infallible and yet, as play begins, are filled with worries about how their heroes might lose. Furthermore, there is the age-old cliche of the hopelessly in-love betrothed, who, on the day of the wedding, nonetheless experience "cold feet."
These examples suggest that there may be a systematic relationship between our confidence that desired outcomes will be achieved and our temporal proximity to the "moment of truth," or the time that the activity is to be performed. In particular, these examples suggest that confidence may diminish the closer we get to the moment of performance. It is easy to be confident that one will pass a test, one's favorite team will win, or one has chosen the right marriage partner well in advance; it is harder to feel so assured as the critical moment draws near.
Although the question of whether confidence varies systematically with temporal distance has obvious theoretical and applied implications, it has received little previous attention. The most directly relevant work comes from experiments in which subjects were informed that they were to take a (fictitious) aptitude test either immediately or in 4 weeks (Nisan, 1972 (Nisan, ,1973 . Among other measures, the subjects were asked to estimate their chances of correctly answering a random question from the exam. Those who thought they were to take the exam in 4 weeks expressed more confidence in answering correctly than those who expected to take the exam right away. Thomas Gilovich, Margaret Kerr, and Victoria Husted Medvec, Department of Psychology, Cornell University. This research was supported by Research Grant MH45531 from the National Institute of Mental Health to Thomas Gilovich and by a Jacob K. Javits Graduate Fellowship to Margaret Kerr. We thank Marianne Perie, Jennifer Lowe,'and Sarah Sirlin for serving as experimenters and David Dunning, Andrew Hayes, Scott Madey, Rory O'Brien McElwee, Dennis Regan, and Amber Story for commenting on an earlier version of the article.
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Although these results are consistent with the present thesis, they are limited in a couple of important respects. First, because subjects in the delayed condition showed up for an experiment only to be told-without any rationale-that the central feature of the study would not take place for another 4 weeks, they might not have been fully convinced that they would ever actually take the test. Thus, the difference in confidence ratings between immediate and delayed conditions might simply reflect a difference in expressed confidence for real versus hypothetical tasks.
A second reason that past research does not directly address our present thesis is that we are concerned with the relationship between confidence and temporal perspective broadly defined. That is, we argue that confidence in one's ability to successfully negotiate various tasks ought to be greater with increasing prospective or retrospective distance. We propose that people tend to be more confident in their abilities well before than right before a given task, and they tend to have more confidence that they could have succeeded at a task well after the time for doing so has passed. Taking a heavy course load, for example, is likely to seem less difficult to alumni than to currently enrolled students.
Although there is little previous research that directly addresses this proposed relationship between confidence and temporal distance, there are a number of theoretical analyses and empirical results that have some bearing on the issue. In particular, Lewin's analysis of different types of conflict (Lewin, 1951) , the work by Cantor and Norem on "defensive pessimism" (Cantor & Norem, 1989; Norem & Cantor, 1986a , 1986b , and that of Tetlock and others on "accountability" (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock & Kim, 1987) are all potentially relevant. Also pertinent are studies in the attribution literature that have looked at attributions for a given performance as a function of whether subjects expect to perform again in the future (Feather & Simon, 1971; Radloff, 1966; Wortman, Costanzo, & Witt, 1973) . We return to a discussion of how these various strands of research relate to the present thesis when we examine possible mechanisms responsible for the proposed relationship between confidence and temporal distance. Our first order of business, however, is to test whether such a relationship exists. Accordingly, we begin with three studies that document the existence of the proposed relationship. Then, after discussing several possible underlying mechanisms, we present a fourth experiment that provides data in support of one of them.
Study 1: Preliminary Evidence
For academicians, the most convenient way to examine the relationship between confidence and temporal distance is to ask students how well they expect to do on an exam both well before and right before it is scheduled. Accordingly, we conducted just such a test in two summer-session courses at Cornell University, one an introductory psychology course and one a class on psychology and law. Students were asked at two points in time, on the first day of class and on the day of the exam, how well they thought they would do on the midterm. They received a brief lecture on percentile scores and were then asked to predict their class standing (in percentiles) on the midterm exam.
As predicted, student confidence was significantly reduced on the day of the exam. The mean estimated percentile scores dropped for the introductory students from 82% on the first day of class to 67% on the day of the exam, paired t(53) = 5.70, p < .001. There was also a significant reduction in confidence on the part of the psychology and law students, although not as large in magnitude-from 79% to 75%, paired f(27) = 2.56, p < .02. The reason for this rather large difference in the magnitude of the effect from one class to the other is unclear, but it may relate to the most salient methodological shortcoming of this type of study: Students may have learned more about the course as time went on, and it may be this difference in course knowledge rather than temporal distance per se that was responsible for the observed effects. By themselves, then, these results can only be considered suggestive.
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A second aspect of this preliminary test is also worth noting. Because subjects were predicting their performance at something that typically benefits from preparatory effort (i.e., studying), the decline in student confidence may have resulted from initially unrealistic expectations about how much they would prepare. At the beginning of the term subjects might have imagined themselves facing the midterm with a perfect attendance record, all assigned papers read twice, copies of previous years' tests in hand, and so forth. Then, on the day of the exam, with few of these goals accomplished, their estimates of midterm performance would understandably diminish. Although such unrealistic expectations about subsequent preparatory efforts may frequently contribute to the real-world tendency for confidence to decline as the time to perform draws near, it is important to determine if the relationship between confidence and temporal distance exists even in the absence of this process. Accordingly, all subsequent experiments used tasks in which performance would not benefit from preparation.
Study 2: Prospective Temporal Distance
To overcome the limitations of our original, "naturalistic" study, we conducted a more controlled laboratory experiment in which students in an introductory psychology course were asked how well they thought they would do on a number of tasks at two points in time: (a) at the beginning of the term when they were told that the principal investigator was soliciting information from students that would help him determine which of the tasks to use in his research and (b) later in the semester, just before they were about to perform the selected tasks. In light of our preliminary findings, we expected subjects to feel more confident about their likely performance when the time to perform was off in the future.
Method
Subjects. One hundred eleven students enrolled in a summer-session introductory psychology course filled out the first questionnaire that assessed their confidence from a temporally distant perspective. From these, 51 subjects were randomly selected and recruited for the second session. All analyses are based only on the responses of subjects who participated in both sessions.
Procedure. All students in the course were given a questionnaire on the first day of class explaining that a professor in the department was conducting research on human performance. To help the professor decide which performance tasks to use in an experiment later in the semester, the students were asked a number of questions about five possible experimental tasks. They were told that on the basis of their responses a subset of the tasks would be selected, and they would serve as subjects in an experiment using the chosen tasks later in the semester. In actuality, the questions were designed to assess how well the students thought they would do on these tasks from a temporally distant perspective.
To obtain more proximate assessments of confidence, a number of these students were brought individually to the laboratory. They were reminded of the earlier questionnaire and told that three of the five experiments had been selected for the research program. Before performing the three tasks, however, they were again asked to estimate how well they thought they would do at each.
Experimental tasks. Five performance tasks were described on the original in-class questionnaire. For the memory task, subjects were told they would be shown a series of 30 nonsense syllables, and, after a 2-min retention interval, they would be asked to recall as many as they could. The lie detection task involved watching videotapes of job interviews in which half the applicants had been told to lie about their qualifications and half had been told to tell the truth. The subjects were to determine whether each candidate was lying or telling the truth. The anagram task required subjects to unscramble 30 anagrams. The reaction time task required subjects to don a pair of headphones and press a button as quickly as possible after hearing a beep. Finally, the persuasion task involved recruiting strangers from around campus to be participants in psychological research.
Subjects were initially quite confident they would do well on all of these tasks. The average estimated percentile ranking obtained during the first, distant perspective was well over 50% for each task. For the three tasks used in the second, proximate perspective, we simply chose those that had the highest estimated percentile ranking initially. Thus, the second session asked subjects for follow-up confidence estimates for the memory task (mean initial percentile ranking = 71 %), the reaction time task (M = 76%), and the persuasion task (M = 71%).
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Dependent measures. For each task, subjects indicated in three ways how well they thought they would perform. First, they estimated their likely percentile standing among all students who performed the task. Second, they rated their anticipated performance on a 10-point scale anchored with the terms very poorly and extremely well. Finally, the description of each task contained a mechanism by which subjects could earn money on the basis of their performance, and subjects predicted how much they would earn. For the memory task, they were told they would receive 20<t for each nonsense syllable correctly recalled; for the reaction time task it was 20<t for each time they hit the response button within 0.5 s; for the persuasion task, it was $1 for each stranger recruited in the allotted 30 min.
Results and Discussion
As anticipated, subjects' assessments of how well they would do dropped precipitiously from the first day of class to the day of the experiment. This decline in confidence was highly significant for eight of the nine comparisons (three measures for each of the three tasks) and marginally significant for the ninth. For the memory task, subjects' estimated percentile rankings dropped from 71% to 61%, paired t(50) = 6.32, p < .001; their scale ratings dropped from 6.6 to 5.5, r(50) = 5.88, p < .001; and their projected winnings dropped from $3.15 to $2.68, t(49) = 3.43, p < .002. For the reaction time task, subjects' estimated percentile rankings declined from 76% to 72%, paired ;(50) = 2.11, p < .05; their scale ratings declined from 7.6 to 7.1, /(50) = 2.95, p < .01; and their projected winnings declined from $4.02 to $3.78, t(50) = 1.74, p <. 10. For the persuasion task, subjects' estimated percentile rankings fell from 71% to 64%, paired t(49)= 3.16, p < .01; their scale ratings fell from 7.2 to 6.2, t(49) = 3.53, p < .001; and their projected winnings fell from $9.95 to $6.60, f(48) = 2.57, p < .02.
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These results strongly reinforce those obtained in our previous study of student expectations about midterm performance. Confidence declined from the beginning of the term to the day of the performance. Moreover, these data overcome the most salient shortcoming of the previous study: In this case, the students did not learn anything more about the experimental tasks as the semester unfolded, so the results cannot be explained as a simple difference in the amount of relevant knowledge. Likewise, the results cannot be attributed to subjects' unrealistic expectations about how much they would prepare for the task in advance because it is hard to imagine how subjects could have thought they could productively practice for a rote memory test, anagrams, or a reaction time test.
If unrealistic expectations about one's intervening preparatory efforts are not the cause of the relationship between confidence and temporal distance, what is? We address this question later. First, however, we turn to an investigation of whether the effect we have documented prospectively also applies retrospectively. Does the confidence people have, long after the fact, that they would have done well exceed the confidence they feel just before or just after the task is performed?
Study 3: Retrospective Temporal Distance
To examine whether people's confidence tends to grow with hindsight, we asked three groups of subjects how well they would be able to handle an increased work load during a typical semester. One was a group of Cornell students who were asked to assess the likely impact of such an increased work load on their performance in the current semester. A second group of Cornell students made assessments of impact for the most recently completed semester. Finally, a group of Cornell alumni indicated how well they thought they could have handled such an increased work load during a typical semester from their undergraduate years. We predicted that there would be a monotonic trend in the confidence expressed by the three groups of subjects. We thought the alumni would tend to view the increased work load as something that could easily be taken in stride, whereas students making assessments about their current semester would tend to view such an increased burden as unbearable. We expected the assessments made by Cornell students for the previous semester to fall somewhere between these two extremes.
Method
Subjects. To ensure that the two groups of current students were comparable to the group of alumni, all subjects were students who had been or currently were advisees or research assistants of the principal investigator. The current students were recruited during research meetings, advising sessions, and chance encounters in the halls of the psychology department. The alumni, who had left Cornell an average of 3.5 years earlier (SD = 1.75 years), were sent questionnaires through the mail. The return rate was close to 100% for both current students and alumni.
Procedure. All subjects filled out and returned the relevant questionnaire anonymously. The current students were given the questionnaire in person, and 44 (22 in each condition) returned it, without identification, either to the principal investigator's department mailbox or through the campus mail. Thirty-four alumni sent their questionnaires back in a return envelope provided.
The subjects were asked to imagine taking an increased work load during a given semester and to estimate how much that increased load would adversely affect their scholastic and extracurricular lives. There were two forms of the questionnaire that instantiated the increased work load in different ways. In one, the subjects were asked to consider the effect of adding one four-credit course to their semester's schedule. In the other, subjects were asked whether there was any course at Cornell they would have liked to have taken but failed to do so partly out of fear that it might have been too difficult. They were then asked to consider the effect of substituting this more difficult course for the least challenging class in their semester's schedule.
One group of current students (the Current group) was asked to list their present courses and to consider the impact of such an increased work load on their lives that semester. The second group of students (the Recent group) did the same for the semester they had just completed. Subjects in this condition filled out their questionnaires anywhere from 4 to 56 days after finishing their last assignment of the target semester (M = 22 days). The alumni were asked to list a set of courses that represented a typical semester for them during their years at Cornell, and to estimate the impact of the increased work load on such a semester. They were instructed to select a set of courses that was typical both in terms of number of credits and degree of difficulty.
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To assess how well subjects thought they could handle the extra work, they were asked to make a number of numerical estimates and scale ratings of the impact of such an increased burden. In particular, they were asked to estimate how many points it would raise or lower their semester GPA and how many minutes it would increase or decrease the amount of sleep they would get each night. They also rated, on 9-point scales anchored at not at all and a great deal, how much this increased burden would affect: (a) their semester grades, (b) their nightly amount of sleep, (c) their participation in extracurricular activities, and (d) their social lives.
Results
To ensure that the three groups of subjects were comparable in terms of their current or typical (for the alumni) course loads, we examined the number and difficulty of the courses they listed. Ten undergraduates-who were not subjects in this experiment-rated all of the courses listed by at least 1 subject on a 7-point scale, with higher numbers representing more difficult courses. These difficulty ratings, which were highly reliable (Spearman-Brown = .97), were then averaged to form a difficulty index for each course. Then, for each subject, we calculated the average difficulty index for all courses listed by that subject. There were no significant differences in the average difficulty indices among the three groups of subjects, nor were there any differences in the number of courses listed by the three groups.
Turning to our primary data, preliminary analyses of each of the six dependent measures revealed no significant effects of the two ways the increased work load was described (i.e., adding an extra class or substituting a more challenging course for an easier one). As a result, we focus exclusively on the differences between temporal perspectives (presented in Table 1 ).
As anticipated, subjects' confidence that they could cope with an increased work load was directly related to their distance from the time the extra burden was to be faced. On all six measures, the alumni indicated that the extra work load would take less of a toll on their academic and social lives than did either the Current or Recent subjects. On four of the six measures, Recent subjects expressed less concern about disruption than did Current subjects.
To test the significance of these effects, the data were analyzed using a one-way multivariate analysis of variance. This analysis yielded a significant effect of condition, Wilks's lambda = .56, F(12,122) = 3.43, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons indicated that the responses of the alumni were significantly different from those of both the Recent subjects, Wilks's lambda = .82, F(d, 61)= 2.28, p < .05, and the Current subjects, Wilks's lambda = .69, F(6, 61)= 4.65, p < .001. The responses of the latter two groups were also significantly different from each other, Wilks's lambda = .73, F(6,61) = 3.70, p < .005.
Discussion
The results of this study provide clear support for the prediction that being removed in time from some challenge tends to make a person more assured that the challenge could be met with relative ease. Our alumni subjects, when asked to project themselves back to their student days, thought they could handle an increased work load without too much damage to their academic and social lives. Our two sets of current Cornell students were less sanguine. Both Recent subjects, who made their assessments from a closer retrospective vantage point, and Current students, who were immersed in the very semester in question, indicated that they thought the extra burden would take more of a toll.
These findings thus complement those obtained in Studies 1 and 2 that documented increased confidence with greater prospective distance from the event in question. Together these studies demonstrate that there is a systematic relationship between temporal distance-both prospective and retrospective -and subjective confidence. The farther one is from some challenge, the less threatening it appears.
These results also complement a number of previous findings reported in the literature. First, the present results reinforce those of Nisan (1972 Nisan ( ,1973 , who found that subjects who expected to take a (fictitious) aptitude test in 4 weeks were more confident they would answer questions correctly than were subjects who expected to take it immediately. The first two studies reported here obtained analogous results while overcoming a potential artifact associated with Nisan's findings. Second, several investigators have shown that when individuals are faced with an imminent performance, they tend to attribute any earlier successes to external factors such as luck and to avoid any attribution to their own ability (Radloff, 1966; Wortman et al., 1973) . Such a result is not surprising in light of the current findings: When faced with an imminent performance Note.
34.
For both Current and Recent subjects, n = 22; for alumni, n = * The data from the three conditions were not collected at the same time. The data from the alumni and the Current subjects were collected in the middle of one semester, and those from the Recent subjects were collected afterward.
task, individuals experience a decline in confidence, and their attributions for past successes reflect that decline.
The key question raised by both the present results and earlier findings is why does confidence decline with diminished temporal distance? It should be clear at the outset that there is unlikely to be any single cause of the reduction in confidence with diminished temporal distance. The relationship between confidence and temporal perspective is most likely a multiply determined phenomenon. In fact, we have already alluded to one mechanism that often contributes to this phenomenon in real life but that played no role in the results from Studies 2 and 3-initially unrealistic expectations about one's intervening efforts to control the outcome. When far removed from the time a task is to be performed, individuals might think of specific things they can do to bring about a positive outcome (e.g., do all of the reading well in advance of a test, outline the material, obtain an old exam from someone who previously took the course). As the time to perform draws near, however, the opportunity to complete these preparatory tasks often passes with many of them unaccomplished. Confidence declines as various ways of effecting control over the outcome slip through the person's grasp.
Although factors such as these no doubt contribute to the relationship between confidence and temporal distance in real life, the results of Studies 2 and 3 indicate that there must be additional mechanisms at work. What might they be? Several theoretical orientations speak to this question. Research on the phenomenon of defensive pessimism has documented a tendency among even very able students to become pessimistic about their likely performance as an exam approaches (Cantor & Norem, 1989; Norem & Cantor, 1986a , 1986b . Such gloomy personal forecasts are thought to be an effective coping strategy for many individuals: Their (sometimes unwarranted) pessimism prompts productive action-such as extra study time. The subjects in the present experiments may indeed have included a few defensive pessimists, and the typical response tendencies of such subjects may have contributed something to our results. However, it should be clear that the responses of such individuals are not the sole source of our findings. Norem and Cantor (1986b) found rates of defensive pessimism among undergraduate populations of 3% or 4% (Norem & Cantor, 1986b) . In our studies, in contrast, we found a much higher percentage of respondents exhibiting decreased confidence as the critical event drew near. In Study 1, 69% of the students were less confident on the day of the exam than at the beginning of the term, with the remaining students evenly split between those whose confidence increased and those whose confidence stayed the same. Similar rates of declining confidence were obtained in Study 2. Thus, our findings cannot be attributed to the responses of a small minority of hardcore defensive pessimists.
A second line of research with clear significance for the present findings is Tetlock's work on the effects of accountability on human judgment (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock & Kim, 1987) . Tetlock and his colleagues have shown that when people know their responses will be scrutinized by others, their judgments tend to be somewhat less prone to a variety of errors and biases. Particularly relevant is the finding that the tendency to be overconfident in one's judgments (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982; Vallone, Griffin, Lin, & Ross, 1990 ) is diminished when people feel publicly accountable (Tetlock & Kim, 1987) . Tetlock argued that accountability encourages "preemptive self-criticism," whereby individuals actively try to anticipate the weaknesses of and objections to their initial inclinations. An analogous process may have contributed to the present results. As the critical moment draws near, people may feel more inclined to anticipate their own weaknesses and any other potential causes of failure. The "accountability" in this case is not to another person but to an imminent objective reality and to the possibility of having a vague, rosy picture of one's prospects disconfirmed. In other words, we contend that people are loath to think critically of themselves when they do not have to-and from a temporally distant perspective they do not. However, people may find it necessary to reign in their fantasies and own up to their shortcomings as the critical moment-and the prospect of discovering an unpalatable truth-approaches.
Described in this way, such an accountability interpretation meshes nicely with two other theoretical perspectives that we feel are pertinent to our results. As Kurt Lewin articulated in his analysis of different types of conflict, when an individual experiences ambivalence with respect to some event or action, the negative valence associated with it will tend to increase faster and exert more influence than the positive valence the closer the person gets to the event (Lewin, 1951 ; the same point was made by Neal Miller, 1944 , 1959 . Lewin was concerned with the rate of change in a person's attraction to a given event as temporal distance diminishes, but an analogous pattern may apply to thoughts about subjective confidence. The possibility of failure, or the causes of failure, may be more accessible and more persistent the nearer the task becomes.
An increased awareness of the prospect of failure, furthermore, is likely to make the possibility of failing seem more likely. There is ample evidence that merely imagining a hypothetical outcome tends to increase its perceived likelihood (Anderson & Godfrey, 1987; Carroll, 1978; Gregory, Cialdini, & Carpenter, 1982; Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 1985) . Thus, an intensified focus on the possibility of failing-even if only to take stock of what one might do in the event of failure-is likely to diminish subjective confidence. This train of thought, we believe, plays a significant role in the observed relationship between temporal distance and subjective confidence.
Study 4: Thoughts About Success and Failure
To test whether diminished temporal distance tends to increase thoughts about failure and decrease images of success, we conducted a replication of Study 2 in which subjects listed their thoughts about why they might do well or poorly at the different tasks. We could then determine whether subjects who were about to perform the tasks listed more reasons for failure and fewer reasons for success than those for whom the tasks were far off in the future. We could also determine whether such a pattern is correlated with the tendency for confidence to decrease with diminished temporal distance.
Method
The subjects were 40 Cornell undergraduates who were paid $3 for their participation. The experiment was modeled closely after Study 2, with a few modifications. First, the experiment used a between-subjects design. Twenty subjects were randomly assigned to both the proximate and distant conditions, and both groups were run in the laboratory. Subjects in the proximate condition were led to believe they would perform the tasks immediately after estimating how well they would do and specifying the reasons for their estimates. Those in the distant condition were given the same cover story as before about the experimenter needing some preliminary data to determine which tasks to use in his experiments later in the semester. These subjects were led to believe they were to make performance estimates then and there and that they would return to perform the chosen tasks later in the semester.
A second change was the addition of another dependent measurethat is, subjects' thoughts about why they might perform at a particular level. Specifically, subjects were asked to list the factors that might lead them to do well or poorly at the task. Two judges who were unaware of the hypothesis counted the number of elements listed by each subject that would promote superior performance and the number that would lead to inferior performance (interrater r = .87).
Finally, because this additional dependent measure added substantially to the subjects' burden, we reduced the number of performance tasks from three to two. The reaction time task from Study 2 was dropped, leaving subjects to estimate their performance on the memory and persuasion tasks.
Results
Predicted performance. On all three measures for each task, the distant subjects gave more favorable estimates of how they would do than did their counterparts in the proximate condition. The effects were a bit stronger than those obtained in Study 2 for the memory task but much weaker for the persuasion task. For the memory task, distant subjects' percentile rankings (M = 68%) exceeded those of the proximate subjects (M= 5 l%),f(38)= 3.98, p<. 001, as did their scale ratings(6.6 to 5.3, respectively), f(38) = 3.69, p < .001, and projected earnings ($3.28 to $2.41, respectively), Z(38) = 2.98, p < .01. For the persuasion task, distant subjects estimated that they would make more money (M =$11) than did their counterparts in the proximate condition (M = $7.60), r(38) = 1.99, p < .06. However, their percentile rankings and scale ratings, although in the predicted direction, did not yield even marginally significant differences (Ms = 64% vs. 62% for the percentile rankings and Ms = 6.8 and 6.5 for the scale ratings), both ts < 1.0.
We cannot say with any confidence why the results for the persuasion task were so much weaker in this experiment than in Study 2. However, one possibility stems from the fact that Study 2 used a within-subjects design, whereas the present experiment was between subjects. Thus, in this study-unlike in Study 2-it was possible for inattentive subjects in the distant condition to fail to realize that they would not be required to perform the tasks until much later in the semester (thus substantially weakening the impact of the manipulation of temporal perspective). Interviews during debriefing indicated that this was the case in several instances. Interestingly, on the two measures for which the present results are weaker than those in Study 2 (the percentile rankings and scale ratings), the main difference was that the distant responses in the present study were lower. This speculation, of course, cannot explain why such strong results were nevertheless obtained on the memory task.
Thoughts about success and failure. Table 2 presents the mean number of factors subjects identified that might lead them to do well on each task and the mean number that might lead them to do poorly. These data mimic subjects' performance estimates quite closely. Distant subjects identified more reasons why they might do well at these two tasks than did proximate subjects, and they identified fewer reasons why they might do poorly. As with the performance estimates, however, these trends were mainly in evidence on the memory task. On this task, distant subjects identified more reasons for superior performance, /(38) = 3.58, p < .001, and marginally fewer reasons for inferior performance, t(3S) = 1.44, p < .16, than did subjects in the proximate condition.
Internal analyses. More important, did subjects who thought they would do relatively well at our tasks focus more on reasons for superior performance and less on reasons for inferior performance than did subjects who thought they would do less well? The relevant within-cell correlations, presented in Table 3 , indicate that they did indeed. The number of reasons subjects listed for superior performance was positively correlated with all three measures of anticipated performance on both tasks (mean r = .64). Likewise, the number of reasons listed for inferior performance was negatively correlated with each of the anticipated performance measures on both tasks (mean r = -.57).
To assess the extent to which subjects' thoughts about success and failure may have been responsible for the difference in anticipated performance on the part of proximate and distant subjects, we performed a regression analysis in which the relationship between anticipated performance and temporal perspective (i.e., our primary finding) was reexamined after controlling for the content of subjects' thoughts. This analysis was performed for the memory task only, of course, because that was the only task for which significant differences in anticipated performance on the part of proximate and distant subjects was observed. To conduct this analysis, we first created a single measure of the positivity-negativity of subjects' thoughts by subtracting the number of reasons for inferior performance listed by each subject from the number of reasons listed for superior performance. This measure correlated highly with all three measures of subjects' anticipated performance (mean r=.68). The regression coefficients that result from the simple regression of anticipated performance on experimental condition (proximate vs. distant) were 17.1 for subjects' percentile rankings, 1.4 for the scale ratings, and 0.9 for the projected earnings (which of course are also the simple between-conditions differences for the three measures). However, when the positivitynegativity of subjects' thoughts are partialed out through a multiple regression analysis in which anticipated performance is regressed on condition and the content of subjects' thoughts, these coefficients drop to 8.7, 0.7, and 0.4, respectively. Thus, controlling for subjects' thoughts about success and failure reduced the effect of experimental condition by 49%, 50%, and 56% for the three measures of subjects' confidence. Clearly, differences in people's thoughts about various causes of success and failure play a large role in the tendency for confidence to diminish with greater temporal proximity.
Note, however, that a fairly substantial relationship between confidence and temporal distance remained even after subjects' thoughts about success and failure were controlled statistically. As in all such cases, it is unclear how much of the residual correlation was due to (a) there being other mechanisms that contribute to the relationship between confidence and temporal distance and (b) our measure of subjects' thoughts about success and failure not adequately tapping all of their thoughts on the subject. Although the relative contribution of these two factors can only be determined by further research, there is little doubt that both had some influence. First, as we alluded to earlier, the relationship between confidence and temporal distance is almost certainly the product of several mechanisms. Second, there are compelling reasons to believe that the specific thought-listing procedure we used did not capture the full richness of subjects' thoughts about the likelihood of success and failure. Subjects listed their thoughts right after completing the dependent measures, not as they were being completed. Moreover, subjects listed their thoughts through the somewhat effortful procedure of writing them down rather than the less taxing technique of simply vocalizing their thoughts as they occurred. It is likely that some subjects were unwilling or unable to translate all of their thoughts into the written word. Finally, our measure of subjects' thoughts about success and failure simply tallied the number of facilitory and inhibitory causes; it did not discriminate between weak and strong causes of either type and take such differences into account in a more sensitive weighted average.
Although there is nothing we can do at this point to overcome the first two shortcomings of our measure of subjects' thoughts, we can assess the significance of the third. We had a group of six judges (unaware of each subject's condition and confidence ratings) reexamine each subject's thoughts about success and failure and rate them on a 7-point scale. The ratings were done holistically, with -3 corresponding to a set of thoughts that, overall, betrayed an anticipated poor performance and 3 corresponding to a set of thoughts that indicated confidence in a likely superior performance. These ratings were highly reliable (Spearman-Brown = .99), and they correlated even more strongly with all three measures of subjects' confidence than did our earlier, crude tally of the number of facilitory and inhibitory causes mentioned (mean r = .78, as compared to the mean r of .68 from before).
More important is the impact this more sensitive measure had in the regression analysis that examined the effect of temporal distance on subjective confidence after controlling for the content of subjects' thoughts. To reiterate, the regression coefficients from the simple regression of anticipated performance on experimental condition (i.e., our primary findings), were 17.1 for subjects' percentile rankings, 1.4 for the scale ratings, and 0.9 for projected earnings. When these coefficients were recomputed after controlling for our refined measure of subjects' thoughts about success and failure, they dropped to 4.4, 0.3, and 0.2, respectively. In other words, controlling for subjects' thoughts about success and failure reduced the impact of experimental condition by 74%, 79%, and 78%. Thus, even more clearly now, the decline in confidence with diminished temporal distance owes much to a corresponding decline in optimistic thoughts about the causes of success and failure.
Discussion
The results of Study 4 replicate and extend those obtained in Study 2. Subjects who thought they would not have to perform until later in the semester were more confident than those who thought the time to perform was at hand. A thought-listing procedure revealed that the distant subjects focused more on the possibility and causes of success and less on the possibility and causes of failure than did the proximate subjects. Finally, subjects' thoughts about success and failure were highly correlated with their performance estimates, and a regression analysis indicated that such thoughts contributed substantially to the observed differences between temporal perspectives.
The thought-listing data are thus consistent with our account of why confidence decreases with diminished temporal distance. As the time to perform draws near, a person's thoughts about what could transpire become more accountable (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock & Kim, 1987) to what might actually happen, and more attention is paid to the possibility of failure. As with other forms of accountability, the anticipation of imminent feedback about performance might make a person engage in more preemptive self-criticism and thus bring thoughts of the possibility and causes of failure more to the fore. Merely entertaining the prospect of failure, furthermore, is likely to increase the perceived likelihood of failing (Anderson & Godfrey, 1987; Carroll, 1978; Gregory et al., 1982; Sherman et al., 1985) .
Clearly, although our thought-listing data are consistent with this account, they are by no means definitive. We only observed a correlation between subjects' thoughts about success and failure and their estimates of future performance. The regression analysis notwithstanding, we cannot conclude from these data that the differences in subjects' thoughts about success and failure were the cause of the observed differences in performance estimates. A more conclusive test of our account must await the results of an experiment in which subjects' thoughts about success and failure are directly manipulated.
General Discussion
Four studies provided consistent support for the proposition that there is a systematic relationship between temporal distance and subjective confidence. The farther removed from the time a task is to be performed, the easier it is to be optimistic about success. Receiving tenure might not seem so difficult to the first-year assistant professor, but it can seem agonizingly uncertain at the time "the dossier" is assembled. Looking back, it does not seem like it would have been such a hardship to learn to speak French, become accomplished at the piano, or develop a reliable top-spin backhand. To those about to develop these talents, however, the prospects for success can seem rather tenuous indeed.
As this suggests, the relationship between confidence and temporal distance may have important implications for the experience of regret. Indeed, our original reason for conducting the present studies was to examine a potential explanation of a pattern of results we obtained in a separate line of research on the psychology of regret (Gilovich & Medvec, 1992) . Briefly, what we had found in previous research was that although people anticipate experiencing more pain in the immediate aftermath of a regrettable action than a regrettable inaction (cf. Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Landman, 1988) , they nonetheless tend to regret their failures to act more in the long run. Regrettable inactions, in other words, may have more "staying power" than regrettable actions.
The present results may help explain this temporal pattern in regrets about actions and inactions. Many of our regrets about failures to act stem from occasions in which we were unable to summon sufficient courage or resolve when the moment of truth was at hand. We might not ask someone for a date because we are afraid of rejection; we might not make a career change because we are worried about what the outcome will be. As the present results indicate, however, these fears and anxieties tend to diminish with the passage of time. Over time, then, the reasons we failed to act may no longer seem compelling. With no reason for not acting, the failure to act will seem particularly bothersome. Thus, precisely as our research on regret indicates, with the passage of time people should be increasingly troubled by their failures to act.
The present results should also serve as a methodological caution to cognitive social psychologists interested in various phenomena that have been described as optimistic biases. Over the past 20 years there have been numerous demonstrations of people's tendencies to make unduly favorable assessments of their own traits and abilities (Alicke, 1985; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Fields & Schuman, 1976; Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Svenson, 1981) , overly optimistic assessments of what the future has in store for them (Weinstein, 1980; Weinstein & Lachendro, 1982) , and excessively confident predictions about their own and their acquaintances' future behavior (Dunning et al., 1990; Vallone et al., 1990) . What the present research suggests is that such assessments are not invariant; rather, people report greater optimism with increased temporal distance. Although it may not be possible to determine which assessments, proximate or distant, are "correct" 5 (and thus which should be used as the measure of optimism, overconfidence, or self-enhancement), those who work on such topics may be well advised to select the "distance" from which such judgments are made with great care. The rather removed assessment made in the work on overconfidence, of course, is entirely appropriate to the task at hand because the whole point of the research is to determine how well current confidence ratings map onto future events. In contrast, some of the claims made about self-enhancement biases may be a bit overstated because subjects make assessments about their athleticism, idealism, or intelligence with the luxury of having no pressure to demonstrate these traits in the immediate future. If the time to test one's level of these traits were close at hand, subjects' assessments would presumably be less inflated.
fects. We have argued that the relationship between confidence and temporal distance is the joint product of several factors, and we have cited several of them, including unrealistic assessments of future preparatory efforts, defensive pessimism and an increase in accountability and preemptive self-criticism as the time to perform draws near. Is this an exhaustive list of the possible underlying mechanisms? We think not. For instance, one additional possibility involves the inferences people draw from their emotional states (Schwarz, 1990) . Consider two people who are equally confident about their prospects for success at a task-one right before the task is to be performed and the other well before the critical moment. Although both are equally confident, the person closer to the task is nonetheless likely to be more aroused because the task is at hand, and so the necessary motivation and performance routines must be summoned; the prospect of failure-however remote-must be faced now. We propose that the person for whom the task is imminent might use this greater arousal to infer that he or she is not supremely confident after all. Because people are typically more aroused when they are less certain of success, they may engage in a bit of heuristic thinking and conclude that "If I'm this aroused, I must be concerned about my chances of success" (Schwarz, 1990) .
